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SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ENTREPRENEURIAL PERFORMANCE IN RUSSIA:
A PANEL STUDY
ABSTRACT
Drawing on the social embeddedness perspective, this paper examines the impact
of entrepreneurs’ social capital on their firm performance in post-Soviet Russia. Based on
face-to-face interviews with 75 Russian entrepreneurs in 1995, and the follow-up study in
1999, the study contrasts the effects of structural embeddedness,  relational
embeddedness and resource embeddedness on firm performance. The main finding is that
relational embeddedness and resource embeddedness have direct positive impacts on
sales growth, profit margin and return on assets in contrast to structural embeddedness
that has no impact on performance. The research implies that further research should
focus on finding out what dimensions of social capital affect what performance indicators
and how they affect. The practical implication is that entrepreneurs should recruit more
resource-rich weak ties into their personal networks.
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INTRODUCTION
Economic performance of firms in transition economies has been explained by
ownership category, industry, and geographic region (Earle, Estrin & Leshchenko, 1996,
Richter & Schaffer, 1996), start-up capital and previous private sector experience of the
entrepreneur (Johnson & Loveman, 1995). In this study, I examine the impact of
entrepreneurs’ social capital on firm performance and suggest a socialized explanation of
company performance.
In his seminal essay, Granovetter (1985) postulated that actions of economic
agents are embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations and these relations
facilitate and constrain agents’ profit and rent seeking actions. Although there are recent
successful attempts to operationalize and empirically test the exchange process of
embedded actions (Uzzi, 1996, 1997, 1999), the bulk of the empirical research has been
devoted to the aspect of instrumental utilisation of personal relations and networks by
corporate and individual actors (Portes, 1998).
Social capital defined as networks of relationships and assets located in these
networks (Bourdieu, 1986, Burt, 1997a, Coleman, 1988) has been found positively
influencing firm performance (Baker, 1990), product innovation (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998),
and industry-wide network formation (Walker, Kogut & Shan, 1997). Similarly, social
capital of individuals facilitates job and status attainment (Lin, Ensel, & Vaughn, 1981,
Marsden & Hurlbert, 1988), enhances individual’s power (Krackhardt, 1990) and career
mobility (Podolny & Baron, 1997), and impacts CEO compensation (Belliveau, O’Reilly
III, & Wade, 1996).5
Research on personal networks of entrepreneurs revealed that entrepreneurs
perceive and exploit business opportunities in disconnected networks (Burt, 1992), seek
information, advice and social support from network alters (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986,
Birley, 1985, Nohria, 1992), control and manage exchange structures through network
dyads (Larson, 1992), access financial capital (Shane & Cable, 1999), and get an
endorsement from prestigious players to influence perceptions of the quality of their
ventures (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999).
Drawing on the embeddedness perspective and social network theory, I attempt to
link varieties of firm performance with initial social networks of entrepreneurs in the
context of a transition economy – the Russian Federation. I argue that different
dimensions of social capital, e.g., structural composition, relational content and resources,
have varying effects on company performance confirming Granovetter’s idea of
differentiated influences of various types of embeddedness on individuals’ economic
action (Granovetter, 1990: 99).
I seek to make two contributions to the research literature: First, by applying the
embeddedness argument and social capital theory developed and tested in the Western
social environment to the Russian reality, I expand the paradigm boundary to formerly
communist societies. Second, in addition and contrast to the previous research, I
demonstrate the varying utilitarian value of different components of social capital for
several performance indicators and establish a ranking order of their instrumental
usefulness.
Resources of individuals defined as valuable assets possessed by persons and
embedded in a social network constitute the fundamental linkage between actors’6
purposive actions and their outcomes, e.g., entrepreneurial entry and exit (Abell, 1996).
Initial resources of entrepreneurs, therefore, are found to have a lasting impact upon the
venture’s performance (Brush & Chaganti, 1999, Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo,
1994, Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). However, the pattern of dispersion of various
resources among individuals at a given moment in time is a function of social structure
(Stinchcombe, 1965). Different resources or capital are dispersed unevenly across the
hierarchical as well as segmented groups in society (Anheier, Gerhards & Romo, 1995).
The volume of resources possessed by an individual or groups is contingent on the
overall position of that individual or group in the social space. This uneven resource
dispersion across social groups and individuals is referred to resource heterogeneity of
social actors. The resource heterogeneity forms the set of constraints that governs the
functioning of society in a durable way determining the chances of success for
instrumental actions of individuals (Bourdieu, 1986).
Social capital heterogeneity of entrepreneurs refers to the uneven endowment of
entrepreneurs with social resources in terms of network range (Burt, 1983b), relations and
contact resources (Lai, Lin & Leung, 1998). Social capital heterogeneity of entrepreneurs
leads to varieties of firm performance because social relations flavour purchase and sale
decisions of entrepreneurs.
Sociologists elaborated three dimensions of individual’s social capital: structural
embeddedness - the structure of the overall network of relations, relational embeddedness
- the extent to which economic actions are affected by the quality of actors’ personal
relations (Granovetter, 1990: 98), and cognitive embeddedness - the degree to which an
individual shares common code and systems of meaning with a community or collective7
(Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998: 244). Fourth dimension of social capital may be articulated
as  resource embeddedness - the degree to which network ties contain valuable
instrumental resources (Lai, et al, 1998, Lin & Dumin, 1986, Marsden & Hurlbert, 1988).
The resource embeddedness has been referred as “the material quality of ties” (Uzzi,
1996: 675), and it is a function of attributes and characteristics of individual alters, e.g.,
high status contact versus low status contact (Ibarra, 1993). In this study, I focus upon
structural embeddedness, relational embeddedness and resource embeddedness of
entrepreneurs’ social capital.
I operationalize structural embeddedness as network size and heterophily.
Network size is defined as the number of direct ties involving individual units (Burt,
1983b, Marsden, 1990). Network heterophily refers to the degree which an ego network
contains diverse alters, e.g., demographic characteristics or occupational status (Burt,
1983b, Ibarra, 1993, Marsden, 1987, Renzulli, Aldrich & Moody, 1999).
Relational embeddedness has been interpreted as relational content (Burt, 1983a,
1997b, Podolny & Baron, 1997), tie strength (Marsden & Campbell, 1984), and relational
trust (Galunic & Moran, 1999, Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). I operationalize relational
embeddedness as “the friendship domain” indicating strong ties and “the acquaintance
domain” indicating weak ties (Burt, 1983a, Krackhardt, 1992, Lin & Dumin, 1986).
Lai et al (1998) operationalized resource embeddedness as contact’s resource
characteristics that are contingent upon occupational status, authority position, and core
versus peripheral sector. I operationalize resource embeddedness as the extent to which
an egocentric network is comprised of actors of high socioeconomic status and the extent8
to which entrepreneurs have been able to marshal financial resources from their personal
networks.
THE RUSSIAN CONTEXT
The instrumental use of personal connections characterized Soviet society at its
core. Blat – the system of informal contacts served as an alternative social mechanism for
overcoming rigidities in Soviet factory’s production and supply practices (Berliner, 1957)
and obtaining consumer goods and services under the rationing system that characterized
the Soviet economy (Ledeneva, 1998). The scale of informal ties and resources located in
these networks were dependent on the political power of social actors (Shkaratan &
Figatner, 1992). Vladimir Yadov, a leading Russian sociologist, stated in an interview:
“Russian entrepreneurship is embedded in neither markets nor hierarchy but in a hybrid
form of the two. There exist, therefore, parallel structures where the same amount of
money and connections have different values in each. You can obtain the same volume of
profit by spending different amounts of money. Succeeding in Russian capitalism
depends not only on your financial capacity but also on many other factors such as
informal networks, trust, etc. (Author’s interview, May 1995, Moscow). This may
indicate that social relations have profound effects on business transactions in the
transition economy of Russia because of the unstable institutional and deficient
regulatory framework (Sedaitis, 1998, Stark, 1996).
Based upon the logic of social embeddedness and social capital heterogeneity of
entrepreneurs, I propose a number of empirical hypotheses.9
HYPOTHESES
Structural Embeddedness
Network Size. It is assumed that extensive personal networks of entrepreneurs
may increase the likelihood of locating clients and suppliers who are socially bound. This
may facilitate sales stabilization and eventual growth since the embeddedness provides a
flexible room for negotiations that might allow entrepreneurs to convert the social bonds
into revenue growth and other tangible benefits. The personal chemistry between the
entrepreneur and the supplier is likely to enable the entrepreneur to purchase raw
materials and other production inputs at lower prices, and that might influence profit
margin boosting the overall performance. There are empirical evidence that personalized
relations between entrepreneurs and their bankers lead to cheaper interest rates on loans
(Uzzi, 1999), and spin-off firms get favourable rates on equipment leasing from their
parent companies (Webster & Charap, 1993). These arrangements may improve firm’s
financial performance ratios such as return on assets.
Network Heterophily. Heterophilous networks are conducive to interactions of
entrepreneurs with diverse others of different attributes. Bankers may be able to build a
broad range of clients’ base with differentiated needs across different industries, and this
may enable them to customize their products building customer loyalty and spread risks
of defaults. In this way, bankers are likely to build customers’ dependence that may
enhance their client retention and wallet penetration capabilities. Trading firms may get
better access to overdraft facilities, speedy cash management and other services from
embedded relationships with bankers whereas production firms may deliver goods in
time and be flexible to ad hoc customer demands. The network diversity may be crucial10
for manufacturing firms in the Russian condition: the wide-spread phenomenon of inter-
enterprise loans, enterprise arrears for delivered products and barter exchanges that
plagued the Russian economy ever since the late 1980s (Dolgopyatova, 1995) may have
forced Russian manufacturers to diversify their networks in order to survive. The
available empirical evidence supports the proposition that firms in transition economies
enter and build deliberately a complicated web of interconnected firms where assets and
liabilities are creatively dispersed in order to reduce the harming effects of environmental
uncertainties (Stark, 1996). The simple production chain of resource firms makes them
less reliant on personal relations with managers of trading or manufacturing firms
although they are likely to gain benefits from bankers in services such as foreign currency
exchange or international money transfer and etc.
The empirical research on effects of structural elements of networks on business
performance produced mixed evidence. Reese & Aldrich (1995) found no evidence to
suggest that the size of an entrepreneur’s personal network affects venture survival.
Aldrich et al documented that network density was associated with profitability of new
ventures whereas network accessibility was positively correlated with business founding
(Aldrich, Rosen and Woodward, 1987). In a study of sales managers in a Fortune 100
firm, Galunic & Moran (1999) found that network size was positively associated with
sales whereas network density was negatively correlated with performance although the
latter was not statistically significant.
The vital role of social networks in Russian entrepreneurship has been widely
reported although most of the evidence researchers displayed remain descriptive (Huber
& Worgotter, 1998). Sedaitis (1998) found that low dense networks of start-up11
entrepreneurs were associated with better sales records in contrast to high-density
networks of spin-off entrepreneurs in Russia.
H1a. The greater the size of initial networks of entrepreneurs, the better the firm’s
performance.
H1b. The greater the heterophily of initial networks of entrepreneurs the better the
firm’s performance.
Relational Embeddedness
Strong and Weak Ties. In contrast to structural embeddedness, Granovetter (1990)
stated, relational embeddedness has typically quite direct effects on individual economic
actions. Constrained and facilitated by a history of interactions and consequent mutual
expectations, actions of economic agents such as price negotiation is largely a function of
the personal chemistry as much as rational cost-benefit calculations. For example, Baker
(1984) found that the increase in number of option traders impeded communication
among actors and that resulted in option price volatility. This happened because as group
size increased, the number of personalized trading relations that the average trader could
sustain did not. In this way, relational quality preconditioned option price stability that
affects directly firm or trader performance.
Strong ties are described to enhance firm performance directly through trust
building, information transfer, and joint problem solving arrangements (Uzzi, 1997).
Weak ties also are regarded as performance boosting devices: vaguely defined
relationships provide that crucial freedom to act upon opportunities and entrepreneurs
with structural autonomy are likely to gain most being not bound by expectations and
obligations (Burt, 1992).12
There is no empirical study to date that examines effects of strong (friendship)
and weak (acquaintance) ties on entrepreneurial performance. There is, however, a
finding that friendship ties are more instrumental in finding better jobs (Lin & Dumin,
1986). Relational trust and closeness as indicators of relational quality have been found
significantly related to managerial sales and innovation performance (Galunic & Moran,
1999). Ethnographic evidence from Russia suggest that friendship and acquaintance as
exchange modes are becoming more and more utility maximizing channels (Ledeneva,
1998).
H2a. The greater the number of strong ties in initial networks of entrepreneurs the
better the firm’s performance.
H2b. The greater the number of weak ties in initial networks of entrepreneurs the
better the firm’s performance.
Resource Embeddedness
Network Resourcefulness. Personal networks that are composed of resourceful
and powerful ties will produce higher rates of returns when they are utilized. Burt wrote:
“a person with a poorly structured network that includes just one well-placed contact can
do well through that contact’s sponsorship regardless of how well the person’s network
as a whole is structured (Burt, 1992: 272). Connections with executives that manage large
corporations and banks are conducive to greater volumes of material resources and
lucrative contracts. Powerful bureaucrats will be able to provide such “services” as state
contracts, tax release and other tangible benefits for firms. Bureaucratic services are
prevalent in Russia where political power has a definite market value (Kryshtanovskaya
& White, 1996). A meager empirical research on contact resources i.e., wealth, status and13
power, found that both the availability of resources and the actual mobilization of
resources played a crucial role in finding better jobs (Lai et al, 1998).
H3a. The greater the resourcefulness of initial networks of entrepreneurs the better
the firm’s performance.
H3b. The greater the resources mobilized from initial networks the better the firm’s
performance.
METHODOLOGY
Sample and Data Collection
The empirical data of the study is composed of the face-to-face interviews with 75
Russian entrepreneurs in February-June 1995, and the follow-up interviews with 56
original respondents in March-May 1999. Pilot interviews with six Moscow firms were
conducted in August 1994.
In 1995, I selected firms on the basis of a stratified random sampling procedure in
three Russian cities, viz., Moscow, Ekaterinburg and Petrozavodsk. The computerised
database of registered businesses of the Moscow City Committee of Statistics, Business
Assistance Centre of the Sverdlovsk Regional Administration in Ekaterinburg, and the
State Committee of Statistics of the Republic of Karelia in Petrozavodsk were used as
sampling populations. I created twelve lists of firms (four industries and three sizes) each
of which contained twenty firm names.
Banks were classified in accordance with the following criteria: small charter
funds < US$50 000, medium charter funds US$50 001-250 000, and large charter funds >
US$250 001. This grouping was confirmed in interviews with Russian experts and
Central bank officials. A similar classification has been established in another study of
Russian banks (Lapidus & van de Waal-Palms, 1997). In manufacturing and the resource14
sector, firms were grouped: small – < 100 employees, medium - 101-500 employees, and
large - > 501 employees. Trade firms were classified: small - < 50 employees, medium –
51-200 employees, and large - > 201 employees. The classification is based on the
definition of small firms in the Russian law and discussions with Russian experts
(Rossiiskaya federatsiya, 1995).
Every second firm on these lists was selected for contact. In 1995, 120
entrepreneurs were contacted and 82 agreed to be interviewed. The response rate was 68
percent. 7 respondents were discovered as ineligible in the field, so that the final sample
consisted of 75 entrepreneurs and directors. There were 50 new ventures or de novo firms
and 25 privatized companies. Interviews were conducted with a specially designed
questionnaire that contained questions on entrepreneurial networks and firm
characteristics. The follow-up study in 1999 concentrated on network dynamics and firm
performance. I re-interviewed 56 original respondents.
___________________
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here
____________________
Financial data was collected from firms as well as other sources such as the
Central Bank of Russia, Association of Russian Banks, the Foundation for Small
Business Development in three cities, and local tax offices. About a half of the sample
firms provided annual reports that contained accounting information. In most occasions,
financial directors or chief accountants were interviewed additionally on financial issues.
Accounting data in Roubles have been deflated by the year’s average exchange rate of
US$ and Russian Roubles published in The Economist. The reliability and consistency of
company financial statements still remains questionable in Russia although significant15
progress has been made for the last few years to bring Russian accounting practices in the
line with the Western standard.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is firm performance. Organisational performance may
be measured in various ways (March & Sutton, 1997, Meyer, 1994). In this paper, firm
performance is measured by sales growth, operating profit margin and return on assets
(Earle et al, 1996). Sales growth for each year (1996, 1997, 1998), and the average sales
growth for three years were expressed in percentage. I use sales growth rather than sales
figures because of the mixed sample of large, medium and small firms as well as firms
from four different industries. Operating profit margin, average operating profit margin,
return on assets and average return on assets were expressed in percentage.
Independent Variables
Independent variables are network size, network heterophily, strong ties, weak
ties, network resourcefulness and financial resources mobilized 95.
Network size is measured by the number of ties indicated by entrepreneurs. I
presented a table where twelve types of occupations (high rank official in ministries and
agencies, middle and low rank official in ministries and agencies, high rank official in
local governments, middle and low rank official in local governments, managers of large
banks, managers of medium and small banks, managers of large manufacturing plants,
managers of medium and small manufacturing plants, managers of large trade firms,
managers of medium and small trade firms, managers large resource sector firms, and
managers of medium and small resource sector firms) were listed in rows, and two types16
of tie strength (friendship and acquaintances) were placed in columns (Lin & Dumin,
1986). I asked the respondents to indicate how many people were in each cell.
Network heterophily measures the degree to which an egocentric network contains
alters from industries other than the respondent’s own occupational background.
Heterophily captures the proportion of non-industry contacts.
Strong ties are the number of “friends”. Weak ties measure the number of
“acquaintances”. I presented the Russian translations: “drug” as friend and “znakomyi” as
acquaintance due to the culture sensitive nature of concepts “friendship” and
“acquaintance”.
Network resourcefulness captures the number of high rank officials in ministries,
high rank officials in local governments, managers of large banks, managers of large
manufacturing plants, managers of large trade firms, and managers of large resource
sector firms. Financial resources mobilized 95 is a binary variable of one if resources
were mobilized before the interview and zero if resources were not mobilized.
Control Variables
Control variables are industry (banking, trade, manufacturing, and the resource
sector),  firm size (large, medium and small), region (Moscow, Ekaterinburg, and
Petrozavodsk) and firm origin (new venture versus privatized). Three cities represent
Russia’s regional economic diversity well. Moscow is the financial and commercial
center whereas Ekaterinburg is famous for its heavy industry. The timber industry and
trade is highly developed in Petrozavodsk, the capital city of the Republic of Karelia. All
controls were turned into dummies and included in the regression analysis.17
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
The mean performance indicators given in Table 3 show that Russian firms
performed poorly: average sales growth for three years was 1% (s.d. = 0.33), average
profit margin was – 22% (s.d. = 0.86), and average return on assets was – 9% (s.d. =
0.96).
The mean network size was 34 persons (s.d. = 9.42) and the mean heterophily was
82% (s.d. = 0.06). A typical entrepreneur had 12 friends (s.d. = 4.7) and 22 acquaintances
(s.d. = 6.5). The mean of resource-rich ties was 16 (s.d. = 6.6), and 41 percent of
interviewees (s.d. = 0.49) mobilized financial resources.
Firm Performance
Based on significant correlation coefficients, I included weak ties and resources
mobilized 95 as independent variables and sales growth 98, profit margin 98, return on
assets 98 and average sales growth as dependent variables in the regression analysis.
Table 4 provides the results of multivariate regression predicting firm
performance as a function of social capital of entrepreneurs, controlling for industry, firm
size, firm origin and region. The baseline model (1) includes industry, size, firm origin
and region dummies. Resource sector dummy, Petrozavodsk dummy, medium size
dummy, and privatised dummy were excluded in the regression analysis due to their
weak contributions to the models. Models 2-7 show the effects of two independent
variables on various performance indicators. Model 2 demonstrates that weak ties (B =
0.02, p<0.05) are positively related to sales growth 98 although the model is not
significant. Model 3 indicates that resources mobilized 95 (B = 0.35, p<0.01) are18
associated with sales growth 98 and the model is significant (F = 2.11, R² = 0.25). Model
4 reports that weak ties (B = 0.01, p<0.05) and resources mobilized 95 (B = 0.37, p<0.01)
both are positively and significantly correlated to sales growth 98. The overall model is
also significant (F = 3.50, R² = 0.39). Models 5 and 6 reveal that weak ties are positively
correlated to profit margin 98 (B = 0.05, p<0.05) and return on assets 98 (B = 0.05,
p<0.05). None of the models is significant. Model 7 shows that resources mobilized 95
(B = 0.26, p<0.01) are associated with average sales growth, and the model (F = 1.97, R²
= 0.17) is significant.
DISCUSSION
Pearson’s correlations presented in Table 3 confirm that no indicator of structural
dimension of entrepreneurs’ social capital is associated with firm performance variables.
This means that the proposed hypotheses on network size (H1a) and heterophily (H1b)
are not affirmative. The finding is consistent with Granovetter’s (1990) conclusion that
structural embeddedness does not affect directly individuals’ economic actions. The
heterogeneity in structural characteristics of social capital does not lead to differentiated
performance of Russian entrepreneurial firms.
While strong ties (friendship) do not facilitate better performance, weak ties
(acquaintance) do influence positively firm’s sales growth, profit margin and return on
assets. Hypothesis 2a is not supported whereas hypothesis 2b is confirmed. The finding is
in the line to confirm tentatively the proposition that relational embeddedness directly
impacts economic actions. The initial heterogeneity in relational dimension of social
capital is conducive to diverse performance outcomes.19
The empirical evidence rejects the hypothesis on resourcefulness (H3a), i.e., the
availability of resources, but supports the hypothesis on resources mobilized 95 (H3b),
i.e., the actual utilization of resources. The fact confirms the relative explanatory power
of resource embeddedness as a dimension of social capital. In contrast to weak ties that
had affected all three performance indicators, resources mobilized 95 have boosted sales
growth 98 and average sales growth. This indicates that different aspects of social capital
influence different performance indicators. Overall, varieties in performance parameters
are the result of the resource heterogeneity of social networks of Russian entrepreneurs.
The striking finding is that weak ties and resources are useful in the period of
economic crisis: two variables are significant in 1998, the year of the Russian default. It
may be tentatively concluded that social capital is particularly valuable in the condition
of extreme uncertainty.
CONCLUSION
Various dimensions of individuals’ social capital have different effects on
entrepreneurial performance in Russia: Relational embeddedness and resource
embeddedness have direct positive impacts on sales growth, profit margin and return on
assets in contrast to structural embeddedness that has no impact on performance. The
heterogeneity in relational and resource dimensions of initial social capital of
entrepreneurs, therefore, determines varieties of entrepreneurial performance in Russia.
The study leads to the conclusion that the basic assumptions of embeddedness
perspective and social capital theory pertains in the Russian social and economic
conditions.20
Several limitations should be emphasized. The sample size is relatively small, and
therefore, one should be cautious of over-generalization of the results. The research site is
Russia, which is going through the simultaneous social, economic and political crises,
and therefore, this limits the generalizability of the findings to more stable Western
societies. Company performance influencing variables such as strategy or entrepreneurial
human capital were not incorporated in the model, and therefore, the study may have
over-emphasized the effects of social capital.
The research implies that further research should focus on finding out what
dimensions of social capital affect what performance indicators, and how they affect. The
practical implication is that entrepreneurs should recruit more resource-rich weak ties
into their personal networks.21
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TABLE 1
The Number of Entrepreneurs Interviewed in 1995
Industry
Banking Trade Manufac. Resource
sector
Total
Moscow 7 9 12 2 30
Size:
Large 6431 1 4
Medium 1221 6
Small -37- 1 0
Ekaterinburg 10 4 6 3 23
Size:
Large 4141 1 0
Medium 2111 5
Small 4211 8
P e t r o z a v o d s k 5845 2 2
Size:
Large 1113 6
Medium 2522 1 1
Small 221- 5
Total
22 21 22 10 75
TABLE 2
Follow-up Interviews in 1999
“Location” after 4 years
No-Contact: 9
Murdered 2
Committed suicide 1
Left the country 2
Hiding from criminal charges 2
Unreachable 2
Not in Business: 7
Hired middle managers 2
Civil servant 1
Local politician 1
Unemployed 1
Retired 1
In Business: 59
Refusal 3
Interviewed 5627
TABLE 3
Means, Standard Deviations and Pearson’s Correlations
V a r i a b l e s M S D 123456789
1 Network size 34.4 9.42
2N e t w o r k
heterophily
0.82 0.06 .06
3 Strong ties 12 4.70 .78¶ .04
4 Weak ties 22 6.44 .89¶ .05 .41¶
5 Resourcefuln
ess
16 6.6 .88¶ .07 .61¶ .84¶
6 Resources
mobilized 95
0.41 0.49 .18 .15 .10 .19 .17
7 Sales growth
96-95 (%)
0.19 0.58 .08 -.07 .08 .05 .01 .17
8 Sales growth
97-96 (%)
0.04 0.37 -.06 .08 -.16 .02 -.09 .17 .32*
9 Sales growth
98-97 (%)
-0.19 0.43 .20 -.12 .00 .29* .27* .35* .03 .48¶
10 Average
sales growth
(%)
0.01 0.33 .11 -.06 -.00 .16 .09 .32* .72¶ .78¶ .64¶
11 Profit margin
95 (%)
-0.32 2.66 -.04 -.05 -.15 .05 -.03 -.13 -.06 .27* .27
12 Profit margin
96 (%)
-0.32 1.85 -.05 .01 -.13 .01 -.09 -.17 .16 .23 .01
13 Profit margin
 97 (%)
-0.71 3.23 -.10 -.10 -.19 -.02 -.14 -.23 .06 .32* .15
14 Profit margin
98 (%)
-0.46 1.16 .27 .26 .09 .33* .20 .03 -.06 .20 .30*
15 Average
profit margin
(%)
-0.22 0.86 .04 .15 -.02 .07 -.08 -.10 .22 .20 -.05
16 Return on
assets 95 (%)
0.13 0.83 -.04 .25 -.00 -.06 -.06 .17 -.03 .13 .25
17 Return on
assets 96 (%)
0.02 1.01 .12 .13 .07 .13 .06 .21 .15 .17 .24
18 Return on
assets 97 (%)
-0.13 0.99 .16 .08 .06 .18 .07 .18 .19 .34* .39¶
19 Return on
assets 98 (%)
-0.40 1.40 .29* -.01 .17 .29* .20 .21 .18 .20 .38¶
20 Average
return on
assets (%)
-0.09 0.96 .17 .10 .09 .17 .09 .21 .14 .23 .35¶
*p< 0.5
  ¶p<0.0128
Table 3 (Con’t)
V a r i a b l e s 1 01 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 9
11 Profit margin
95 (%)
.18
12 Profit margin
96 (%)
.19 .81¶
13 Profit margin
97 (%)
.22 .83¶ .87¶
14 Profit margin
98 (%)
.16 .18 .36¶ .26
15 Average
profit margin
(%)
.19 .40¶ .82¶ .87¶ .62¶
16 Return on
assets 95 (%)
.14 .24 .24 .19 .32* .28*
17 Return on
assets 96 (%)
.26 .21 .32* .22 .46¶ .41¶ .82¶
18 Return on
assets 97 (%)
.41¶ .14 .24 .25 .47¶ .47¶ .75¶ .87¶
19 Return on
assets 98 (%)
.35* .00 .10 .03 .50¶ .32* .59¶ .79¶ .90¶
20 Average
return on
assets (%)
.33* .14 .23 .17 .49¶ .40¶ .83¶ .94¶ .96¶ .92¶
*p< 0.5.
 ¶p<0.0129
TABLE 4
Regression Analysis Predicting Firm Performance as Function of Initial Networks (N=56)
Sales growth in 1998 Profit
margin
1998
Return
on assets
1998
Average
sales
growth
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Industry
Dummies
Banking -0.14
(0.23)
-0.22
(0.22)
-0.07
(0.20)
-0.27
(0.20)
-0.56
(0.58)
-0.12
(0.70)
-0.15
(0.15)
Trade -0.15
(0.20)
-0.28
(0.21)
-0.17
(0.19)
-0.41
(0.17)
-0.14
(0.56)
-0.18
(0.67)
-0.16
(0.14)
Manufacturing -0.03
(0.21)
-0.18
(0.21)
0.08
(0.19)
-0.16
(0.18)
-0.17
(0.56)
-0.34
(0.68)
0.03
(0.14)
Size dummies
Small -0.03
(0.14)
0.09
(0.15)
-0.02
(0.14)
-0.65
(0.40)
-0.64
(0.47)
0.11
(0.10)
Large 0.29
(0.14)
0.20
(0.14)
0.17
(0.14)
-0.12
(0.38)
0.01
(0.46)
0.08
(0.11)
New venture
dummy
0.22
(0.13)
0.22
(0.12)
0.23
(0.12)
0.26
(0.11)
0.46
(0.33)
0.37
(0.39)
0.19
(0.09)
Region
dummies
Moscow -0.09
(0.15)
-0.01
(0.14)
Ekaterinburg 0.30
(0.17)
0.31
(0.15)
Independent
variables
Weak ties 0.02*
(0.01)
0.01*
(0.00)
0.05*
(0.02)
0.06*
(0.03)
Resources
mobilized 95
0.35¶
(0.12)
0.37¶
(0.11)
0.26¶
(0.09)
Model F 1.65 1.61 2.11* 3.50¶ 1.84 1.90 1.97*
R² 0.23 0.20 0.25 0.39 0.23 0.23 0.17
Values represent unstandardized coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < .05
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